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Abstract
Most of the recent research in monetary policy has focused on the use
of a single exogenously speciﬁed standard ad hoc loss function to evalu-
ate policy performance. This literature has come to the conclusion that
backward looking models are more diﬃcult to control i.e. monetary pol-
icy performance deteriorates with an increase in inﬂation persistence. In
this paper we test the validity of this conclusion using both a standard ad
hoc loss function and a model consistent loss function across competing
models of inﬂation persistence. We ﬁnd that conclusions vary markedly
with diﬀerent types of loss functions. We also look into the case where
the policymaker is uncertain about the pricing behavior of ﬁrms and in-
vestigate the presence of robust policy rules. We ﬁnd that the existence of
robust rules depend crucially on the type of loss function used to evaluate
outcomes.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E31; E52; D81
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One of the most important recent developments in monetary policy analysis is
the emergence of small scale monetary business cycle models, generally referred
to as New Keynesian models. These models are notable for using microeconomic
principles to describe the behavior of the households and ﬁrms, while allowing
nominal rigidities and ineﬃcient market outcomes, and being similar in structure
to some of the traditional models used for policy analysis (such as the IS/LM
model).
The New Keynesian models can be characterized primarily by two key equa-
tions. The ﬁrst one is an aggregate demand equation that relates output gap
negatively to the real interest rate and positively to future output gap. A rise in
the real interest rate induces intertemporal substitution and reduces aggregate
demand and the current output gap. The second key equation is the inﬂation
adjustment equation, more commonly known as New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC), and relates domestic inﬂation to the output gap and a supply shock.
The baseline NKPC developed in Calvo (1983) has received a lot of attention in
the literature as it is tractable and concisely summarizes the main mechanisms
through which policy decisions aﬀect the working of the economy. However, the
baseline NKPC does a very poor job of explaining the dynamics of inﬂation,
interest rate and output in the US as well as other developed countries. Specif-
ically regarding price rigidities, the baseline NKPC does not match the inertia
displayed in the inﬂation data of the main industrialized countries.1 This has
resulted in the development of a new generation of models that aimed at retain-
ing the microeconomic approach to describing the behavior of the households
and ﬁrms while trying to explain the movement in the inﬂation data. Several
works in the literature have introduced alternative ways to model the behavior
of price setters so that the inﬂation adjustment equation would incorporate an
inertial component and therefore exhibit a better ﬁt.
Most of the literature relies on these New Keynesian models to assess mone-
tary policy performance. However, though the models incorporating inﬂation in-
ertia have done well in matching the data, several papers like Levin and Williams
(2003) and Adalid et al. (2005) have found these models to be more diﬃcult to
control. These papers look at model uncertainty and conclude that a higher loss
would be achieved if the policymaker works with a more forward-looking model
and the true model were characterized by a greater persistence. This policy ad-
vice is questioned in Walsh (2005) when model consistent loss function is used
to assess the performance of monetary policy in a hybrid model. The model
1While the baseline NKPC predicts that current inﬂation depends only on current and
future values of output gap and shock, a large econometric literature, including Nelson and
Plosser (1992), Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Pivetta and Reis (2004), conclude that postwar
inﬂation in U.S. and other industrial countries exhibits high persistence. Other works like
Baum et al. (1999) and Francisco and Bleaney (2005) have looked at developing countries and
have found evidence for persistent inﬂation.
2consistent loss function, popularized by Woodford (2003a), is derived from a
second order approximation of the representative agent’s welfare. In this loss
function, both the relative weights on the variables in the loss function as well
as the variables appearing in the loss function depend on the economic model.
Walsh (2005) works with a hybrid model where current inﬂation depends on
both lagged inﬂation as well as future expected inﬂation. He concludes that
when policy outcomes are evaluated using model consistent welfare objectives,
the overall loss declines with inﬂation inertia.
Given the diﬀerent conclusions obtained about policy performance using
diﬀerent kinds of loss functions, it becomes imperative to investigate further
the use of model consistent objectives in evaluating policy performance. For
this purpose, we use two models of hybrid Phillips curve as derived by Gali and
Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003a). Our analysis diﬀers from Walsh (2005) in
several ways. We look at two varied models that exhibit diﬀerent price setting
behavior and evaluate policy outcomes using both standard ad hoc and model
consistent objectives. The price setting behavior of these models have been
analyzed in Gali and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003a). In this paper,
the policymaker is assumed to follow a simple instrument rule to stabilize the
economy. Finally, we also consider the case where the policymaker is uncertain
about the exact pricing behavior of the ﬁrm and investigate the presence of
robust rules using both model consistent and standard ad hoc objectives.
In the next section the baseline NKPC and two diﬀerent hybrid versions of
the Phillips curve are set out. Section 3 discusses the standard ad hoc loss and
the model consistent loss function associated with the hybrid Phillips curves.
The fourth section analyzes policy implications of using standard ad hoc versus
model consistent loss function. The ﬁfth section investigates the presence of
robust policy rules in the face of model uncertainty. Finally, the sixth section
concludes.
2 Setup of the Models
2.1 Modelling Inﬂation Inertia
2.1.1 Baseline Calvo Model
The baseline NKPC incorporating staggered price setting was introduced by
Calvo (1983). A fraction (1−α) of ﬁrms are assumed to be able to choose new
prices every period where as the remaining α ﬁrms have to keep their prices
unchanged. For simplicity, the probability that any given price will be adjusted
in any given period is assumed to be (1−α) and is independent of the length of
time since the price was set and what the particular good’s current price may
be. Then it is possible to show that the log of the aggregate price level pt evolves
as a convex combination of the log of the lagged price level pt−1 and the log of
optimal reset prices p∗
t as follows:
3pt = (1 − α) p∗
t + αpt−1. (1)
Let mcn
t be the ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost at time t and let β denote a
subjective discount factor. Then for a ﬁrm that chooses price at t to maximize
expected discounted proﬁts subject to the Calvo pricing rule, the optimal reset
price may be expressed as:
p∗










In setting its price at t, the ﬁrm takes into account of the expected future
path of nominal marginal cost, given the likelihood that its price may remain
ﬁxed for multiple periods. Combining equations (1) and (2) we can derive an
inﬂation equation of the type:
πt = βEtπt+1 + κmct, (3)
where κ ≡
(1−α)(1−αβ)
α depends on the frequency of price adjustment α and
subjective discount factor β. The real marginal cost is related to a measure
of the output gap. The ﬁrm’s real marginal cost is equal to the real wage it
faces divided by the marginal product of labor. As a result, following Woodford







where mct is the real marginal cost, σ is the inverse of the elasticity of substi-
tution, θ is the price elasticity of demand, ω is the elasticity of labor and xt is
the output gap.
Thus equation (3) can be written as:
πt = βEtπt+1 + ˜ κxt + +επt, (5)






The assumption in the baseline Calvo model that prices remain ﬁxed in
money terms between those occasions upon which they are optimized conforms
with apparent practice of many ﬁrms. However, reconciling this Phillips Curve
with the data proves to be a more complicated task. Fuhrer and Moore (1995)
point out that the benchmark new Phillips curve implies that inﬂation should
lead the output gap over the cycle. A rise (decline) in the current inﬂation
should signal a subsequent rise (decline) in the output gap. However, one ﬁnds
the opposite pattern in the data. The data suggests that current output gap
moves positively with future inﬂation and negatively with lagged inﬂation.2
2See Gali and Gertler (1999) for empirical evidence.
4Equation (5) also predicts that there is no short run trade oﬀ between output
and inﬂation as it implies that the central bank can achieve a disinﬂation of
any size costlessly by committing to set the path of future output gaps equal to
zero. Historical evidence shows that disinﬂations involve a substantial loss in
output.3
The empirical limitations of the baseline NKPC have resulted in the devel-
opment of a number of hybrid versions of the Phillips curve, which take into
account lagged inﬂation.4
2.1.2 Rule of Thumb Price Setters (ROT Model)
Monetary policy has real eﬀects on the economy due to the assumption that
within a given period not all suppliers are able to adjust their prices in response
to ﬂuctuations in demand. We follow Calvo (1983) in assuming that each period
(1−α) fraction of suppliers are oﬀered the opportunity to adjust to a new price.
This is due to the costs of changing prices such as loss of goodwill and menu
costs. However, we also assume that there are costs involved with optimization,
and, as a result, not all ﬁrms who can adjust prices choose optimum price. A
fraction λ of the adjusters (forward-looking ﬁrms) decide to optimize while the
remaining fraction (1−λ) of the adjusters (backward-looking ﬁrms) follow a rule
of thumb. Those suppliers who do not set their prices in the optimal manner





t−1 + πt−1, (6)
where p∗
t−1 is the average price set in the most recent round of adjustment with
a correction for inﬂation. The forward-looking ﬁrms set their prices exactly as
in the baseline Calvo model. Accordingly their price is expressed as:
p
f










The index for the newly set prices maybe expressed as:
¯ p∗




3Central banks all over the world pursue the common primary goal of achieving a low
and stable level of price variability and have implemented disinﬂation policies in order to
avoid the well known costs of inﬂation. This is specially true for developing countries, which
have experienced high and volatile mean inﬂation. Nevertheless, countries with higher mean
inﬂation have experienced a much lower inﬂation-output trade oﬀ than low inﬂation countries.
Ball et al. (1988) look at sample of 43 developing and developed countries and ﬁnd that there
is a signiﬁcantly strong negative relationship between mean inﬂation and inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ.
4Several papers like Gali and Gertler (1999), Amato and Laubach (2005), Woodford (2003a)
have derived a version of the Phillips curve that accounts for lagged inﬂation.
5The aggregate price level evolves according to:
p∗
t = (1 − α) ¯ p∗
t + αpt−1. (9)
Combing equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) we get the Gali and Gertler hybrid
Phillips curve as:5
πt = γfEtπt+1 + γbπt−1 + ˜ κxt + επt. (10)
where
˜ κ ≡
(1 − α)(1 − αβ)










α + (1 − λ)(1 − α(1 − β))





equation (10) collapses to (3), which is the standard New Keynesian Phillips
Curve.
2.1.3 Indexation to Past Inﬂation (IPI Model)
An alternative way to incorporate past inﬂation is to correct in a simple way
for increases in the general price index. Yun (1996) assumes that prices are
increased automatically at the long run average rate of inﬂation between the
occasions on which they are reconsidered. In countries where inﬂation has been
high, indexation schemes are generally based on a measure of inﬂation over some
short interval of time. Thus it becomes more plausible to assume automatic
indexation of price commitments to the change in the overall price index over
some recent period. It is not plausible to assume that ﬁrms would be able to
index prices to the current price index as it will create a simultaneity problem.
It is more plausible to assume indexation of price to the change in the overall
price index over some past time interval. Woodford (2003b) assumes partial
indexation and claims that this improves the empirical ﬁt of the model.
It is assumed that each period a randomly chosen (1 − α) of all prices are
reoptimized. However, the prices of the goods that are not optimized are set
according to the indexation rule:
pt = pt−1 + γπt−1, (11)
5This Phillips curve is identical to the one obtained by Gali and Gertler (1999) and Amato
and Laubach (2005)
6where 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available
inﬂation measure. The ﬁrms who get a chance to reoptimize set their prices
exactly as in the original Calvo formulation given by:
¯ p∗










The aggregate price in every period is given as:
p∗
t = (1 − α) ¯ p∗
t + αpt. (13)
Solving equation (11), (12) and (13) we obtain a Phillips curve of the following
form:6
πt − γπt−1 = βEt (πt+1 − γπt) + ˜ κxt + +επt, (14)





Note that when γ = 0, equation (14) collapses to (3), which is the standard
New Keynesian Phillips Curve.
2.2 Rest of the Model
The remaining model consists of an aggregate demand equation. The utility
maximization of the representative agent yields the equation:
xt = Etxt+1 −
1
σ
(it − Etπt+1) + εxt. (15)
Recently some works like Gali et al. (2004) and Amato and Laubach (2005)
have also looked at rule of thumb consumers and habit formation, which yield
a variant of the aggregate demand equation. These works have been motivated
by papers like Campbell and Mankiw (1989), which ﬁnd empirical support of
non-Ricardian behavior among a signiﬁcant fraction of households in US and
other industrialized countries. However, since the main objective of this paper
is to investigate inﬂation dynamics, we follow works like McCallum and Nelson
(1999), Clarida et al. (1999), Woodford (2003a), and Walsh (2003) and work
with the benchmark aggregate demand equation, given by equation (15).
The shock process follow an AR(1) process of the following type:
επt+1 = ρπεπt + ξπt+1,and (16)
εxt+1 = ρxεxt + ξxt+1. (17)
We obtain a well speciﬁed general equilibrium model that consists of equa-
tions (15), (16), (17) and either (10) or (14).
6This Phillips curve is identical to the one obtained by Woodford (2003a)
73 Welfare Implications of Inﬂation Inertia and
the Instrument Rule
3.1 Standard ad hoc Loss Function
In the standard literature, majority of researchers consider the case where the
policymaker tries to stabilize both inﬂation and the output gap around steady
state values, which are assumed to be zero for simplicity. This kind of consid-




where λx is the weight the policymaker puts on output gap stabilization relative
to inﬂation.7. If λx = 0 then we have a policymaker that has been described
by Mervyn King as “inﬂation nutter” i.e. the policymaker only cares about
inﬂation ﬂuctuations and not output gap ﬂuctuations. On the other hand if
λx = 1 then the policymaker is equally concerned about output gap and inﬂation
stabilization.
3.2 Model Consistent Loss Function
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003b) have shown that under
certain conditions, a local approximation to the expected utility of the repre-
sentative household is inversely related to the expected discounted value of a
conventional quadratic loss function. The variables and the weights entering
such a loss function depend on the behavior of the consumers and the price
setters.
In this section we look at the structural loss functions that correspond to
the two types of inﬂation inertia that was introduced in Section 2.
3.2.1 Rule of Thumb Price Setters
The use of rule of thumb behavior described in Section 2.1.2 does aﬀect the
objective of the policymaker. The policymaker chooses at some point t=0 a
plan that maximizes the representative agent’s welfare deﬁned by:
Vt = U (Yt,zt) −
Z 1
0
v (yt (i),zt)di, (19)
where v (yt (i),zt) is the disutility of producing good yt (i) and zt is a vector of
exogenous shocks. A second order approximation of equation (19) around the





7Several papers like Levin and Williams (2003) and Svensson (2000) also include an interest
rate smoothing objective which can be justiﬁed on the basis of ﬁnancial stability concerns
8where the period loss Lt is given as:8.
Lt = π2
t + λxx2
t + λ∆π (πt − πt−1)
2 , (21)
where λx = ˜ κ
θ and λ∆π = 1−λ
αλ . Since a fraction (1 − λ) of price setters are
learning about the optimal price by observing the average of prices set in the
previous period, there is a reason for reducing variability in the change in inﬂa-
tion. This additional term increases the weight on inﬂation stabilization relative
to output gap stabilization, as any reduction in inﬂation variability reduces the
variability of the change in the inﬂation.
3.2.2 Indexation to Past Inﬂation
When the inﬂation inertia is due to backward indexation as shown in Section
2.1.3, and the utility of the representative agent is given by equation (19), then
the structural period loss function is given as:9
Lt = (πt − γπt−1)
2 + λxx2
t, (22)
where λx = ˜ κ
θ and ˜ κ and θ have same deﬁnition as in Section 2.1.3.
We deﬁne zt ≡ πt − γπt−1. When γ = 1 i.e. we have full indexation then
equation (22) points out that the the policymaker must stabilize the rate of
inﬂation acceleration ∆πt around zero rather than the rate of inﬂation itself.
Due to the complete indexation to past inﬂation, constant inﬂation does not in-
troduce any distortions in the economy. The distortions are only due to changes
in rate of inﬂation.
3.3 Instrument Rule
Following the approach in Levin and Williams (2003) and Adalid et al. (2005)
we consider a three parameter family of simple interest rate rule, where the
nominal interest rate reacts to current inﬂation, output gap and lagged interest
rate:
it = ˜ απt + ˜ βxt + ˜ ρit−1. (23)
The coeﬃcients ˜ α and ˜ β represent the policymaker’s short term reactions to
the deviation of inﬂation and output gap from their target values. The coeﬃcient
˜ ρ characterizes the inertia of the interest rate response also interpreted as the
desired degree of policy smoothing. The above rule is what Levin et al. (1999)
refer to as outcome rules. i.e. rules involving a small subset of current and
lagged variables. They conclude that this class of simple rules perform as well
as more complicated rules involving forecasts of inﬂation and output gap, across
8A detailed derivation of the structural loss function is provided in Amato and Laubach
(2005)
9A detailed derivation of the structural loss function is provided in Walsh (2003) and
Woodford (2003b)
9diﬀerent models of the US economy. These simple rules tend to be more robust
to model uncertainty than more complicated rules. According to optimal control
theory, policy rules should incorporate all the available information, and hence
include all the state variables of the speciﬁc economic model. However, this
rule which is optimal for a particular model may perform disastrously, if the
economy is described by another model, which involves a diﬀerent set of state
variables.10
From an institutional point of view, simple rules have the advantage of
greater transperancy; as a result they can be monitored by and communicated
to the public sector. Even from an empirical point of view Clarida et al. (1998)
show that simple interest rate rules match well the data for the United States
and a number of European countries. Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2004) provide ev-
idence for the euro area as a whole and conclude that Taylor-like rules estimated
over the last two decades appear to be able to capture on average, substantial
elements of past monetary policy behavior.
4 Policy Implications of Using Model Consis-
tent Objectives
Recently several papers like Levin and Williams (2003), Adalid et al. (2005) etc.
have employed a single loss function to evaluate the consequences of employing
a policy rule that is optimal for one model when the economy is described by
structural equations, which are very diﬀerent from the ones that were used
to obtain the optimal rule. However, there are several problems associated
with using a single loss function. Giannoni and Woodford (2003) and Ireland
(2003) point out that as one moves from a forward looking model to a relatively
backward looking model, not only does the parameters of the welfare-theoretic
loss function changes, but there is also a dramatic change in the basic functional
form itself. When dealing with microfounded models, the loss function can
represent an approximation of the representative households welfare. In such a
scenario, both, parameters entering the loss function, as well as the functional
form of the loss function itself, depend on the deep parameters of the model and
the structural equations that describe the behavior of the economy.
Walsh (2005) considers the New Keynesian model developed by Benigno and
Woodford (2005), which explicitly incorporates the case of a distorted steady
state. They assume away the existence of employment subsidy that has been as-
sumed in the literature to oﬀset the distortion due to monopolistic competition.
Walsh (2005) shows that in this model one reaches very diﬀerent conclusions
using a standard loss function like (18) than when one uses a welfare-theoretic
10Levin and Williams (2003) show that optimal targeting rules, which have complicated for-
mulation in terms of leads and/or lags of target variables perform disastrously if the economy
is described by a competing model.
10loss function. In this section, we extend the analysis of Walsh (2005) to include
two models incorporating inﬂation inertia reviewed in Section 2. These models
incorporate very diﬀerent price setting behavior.
We look at the implications of evaluating policy performance using a stan-
dard ad hoc loss function versus a model consistent loss function. We ﬁrst
consider the case where the policymaker is interested in minimizing the stan-
dard ad hoc loss function. We obtain the optimized interest rate rule for each
of the models. The optimized interest rate rule includes optimized coeﬃcients
on current inﬂation, output gap and lagged interest rate that minimizes the
standard ad hoc loss function.11. Finally, we report the performance in terms
of the central bank loss function. We then repeat this procedure for the case
where the policymaker seeks to minimize the model consistent loss function. To
explore these cases we consider a calibrated version of the model. The baseline
parameters for the ROT and the IPI models have been taken from Amato and
Laubach (2005) and Woodford (2003b) respectively. These parameter values
have been reproduced in Table 1.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters for the Two Models
Structural Parameters Implied Parameters Innovations
α = 0.66 κ = 0.024 ρπ = 0.5
β = 0.99 ρx = 0.5
σ = 0.157 σ
2
(ξ,x)= 1




4.1 Rule of Thumb Price Setters
The value of the loss function, when the policymaker implements an optimized
rule, is reported below in Table 2. Here LMC
MC is the value of the model consistent
loss function when the policymaker implements a rule optimized for this loss
function, while LStd
Std is the value of the standard ad hoc loss function when an
optimized rule for this loss function is implemented.
11The optimized coeﬃcients on the lagged interest rate, current inﬂation and current output
gap is obtained using the method outlined in S¨ oderlind (1999) and the fminsearch routine in
Matlab. The set up of the model and the method used to calculate the value of the loss
function is described in greater detail in Appendix A and B
11Table 2: Performance of Optimized Policy in the Rule of Thumb Behavior Model
Inertia Weights Standard ad hoc Loss Model Consistent Loss
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 − λ λx λ∆π L
Std
Std V arπ V arx V ar∆π L
MC
MC V arπ V arx V ar∆π
0.20 0.0297 0.387 1272.80 12.77 0.18 12.95 938.33 4.01 135.69 4.10
0.40 0.0181 1.01 3418.09 32.12 2.95 35.06 1286.83 3.22 386.65 2.92
0.60 0.0102 2.28 8887.78 63.28 29.24 92.52 1269.14 1.48 846.08 1.26
0.80 0.0044 6.3 14845.21 80.84 76.10 156.94 827.99 0.23 1609.84 0.18
1.00 0.00 ∞ 17879.88 91.24 100.74 191.88 NaN NaN NaN NaN
As shown in column (4) of Table (2), LStd
Std increases with degree of indexa-
tion. This outcome is in concurrence with the standard result in the literature
that greater persistence is associated with higher loss. Looking at columns (5)
and (6), we observe that both components of the standard ad hoc loss, variance
of inﬂation and the variance of output gap, increase with the degree of inﬂation
inertia, thereby generating a higher loss. However, looking at column (8) we
ﬁnd that when loss is calculated using the model consistent loss function, we
obtain a non monotonic result. The decomposition of the loss function shows
that the magnitude of the variability of inﬂation and inﬂation gap are signiﬁ-
cantly less than the variability of output gap. Thus the outcomes are inﬂuenced
mainly by the variability of the output gap. From columns (9) and (11) it is
clear that in a higher indexed environment both inﬂation and inﬂation gap are
less volatile. Intuitively, when a cost push shock hits these economies, inﬂation
takes longer time to accommodate. In this case, the policymaker would have
to impose a deeper recession in order to stabilize inﬂation. Therefore output
gap becomes more volatile as the degree of indexation increases. On the other
hand, in economies characterized by high inertia, the policymaker puts a smaller
weight on on output gap. Interaction of the increasing variance with the de-
creasing weight on output gap implies that economies with medium levels of
indexation incur greater loss.
4.2 Indexation to Past Inﬂation
The consequences of using a model consistent loss function versus a standard ad
hoc loss function, when the ﬁrms set their prices according to the indexation to
past inﬂation rule, are reported in Table 3. If the policymaker was to evaluate
outcome using a standard ad hoc loss function, we again obtain the standard
result that backward looking models are more diﬃcult to control. Both the
variance of inﬂation and output gap increase with degree of indexation, thereby
yielding a higher loss. In contrast, if the policymaker was to follow a model
consistent loss, he would infer that that the performance of the monetary policy
improves substantially with the degree of inertia (γ). Thus models that exhibit
higher intrinsic persistence, generates lower loss. This contradicts the common
perception that performance of monetary policy decreases with inertia.
12Table 3: Performance of Optimized Policy in the Indexation to Past
Inﬂation Model
Structural Implied Standard ad hoc Loss Model Consistent Loss
Parameter Parameter
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ λx L
Std
Std V arπ V arx L
MC
MC V arz V arx
0.20 0.0486 651.28 6.57 0.04 467.28 4.60 5.72
0.40 0.0486 904.08 9.10 0.11 462.09 4.17 10.59
0.60 0.0486 1422.10 14.06 0.52 447.91 4.00 11.15
0.80 0.0486 2662.00 23.78 3.84 419.84 3.65 12.70
1.00 0.0486 5123.40 33.93 20.35 386.62 3.67 6.95
In the standard ad hoc loss the policymaker’s objective is to minimize the
volatility of inﬂation and output gap. As the degree of indexation increases
it becomes more diﬃcult to stabilize inﬂation around a zero steady state. In
other words, in highly indexed economies it takes longer for inﬂation to return
to its steady state level after a cost push shock. On the other hand, the model
consistent loss incorporates a diﬀerent inﬂation gap represented by (πt−γπt−1).
Here the policymaker is concerned about the dispersion caused by the diﬀer-
ence between current inﬂation and γ times the lagged inﬂation. By reacting to
deviations of inﬂation from the steady state the policymaker is able to reduce
this inﬂation gap. Moreover, a higher value of γ implies that lagged inﬂation
would be closer to current inﬂation which results in a lower loss.
The decomposition of the loss into the variance of its two components ex-
plains the decreasing trend of the LMC
MC. Its clear from Column (7) in Table 3
that variance of zt decreases with an increase in γ. Even though the volatility
of the output gap is not monotonic, its weight in the computation of the loss
is relatively small thereby not inﬂuencing the loss to a great extent. Similarly,
the increasing trend of the LStd
Std reﬂects the increasing variability of both its
components πt and xt as shown in Column (4) and (5) in Table 3.
5 Model Uncertainty
The degree of inﬂation inertia has been a focus of a great deal of theoretical as
well as empirical research. While most researchers agree that the purely forward
looking Phillips curve does not ﬁt the data, there is a great deal of debate on
which is the correct way to model inﬂation inertia. Gali and Gertler (1999) and
Gali et al. (2001, 2002) ﬁnd that the Phillips curve based on the rule of thumb
behavior is consistent with inﬂation dynamics in United States as well as the
Euro area. On the other hand Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouter
(2002) assume partial or full indexation to lagged inﬂation and argue that this
extension of the basic Calvo model improves the empirical ﬁt.
13In this section we consider the case where the central bank is aware that
the true Phillips curve is a hybrid one but is uncertain about the exact pricing
behavior of the ﬁrm. We investigate the presence of robust simple rules using a
procedure similar to Levin and Williams (2003), Cˆ ot´ e et al. (2002) and Adalid
et al. (2005). We measure the relative performance of a speciﬁed rule in a
model by looking at the relative loss. The relative loss, %∆L, is deﬁned as the
percent diﬀerence between the loss under a speciﬁed policy rule and the optimal
commitment rule.
%∆L =
LOpt Simp Rule − LCommitment
LCommitment × 100
Following the literature, we consider a rule generating %∆L signiﬁcantly
below 100 percent to yield satisfactory performance. In contrast, a rule yielding
%∆L well above 100 percent is unacceptable.
However, a common feature of the literature is to carry out this robust-
ness analysis using exogenous loss function only. As pointed out by Ireland
(2003) this procedure might not be consistent. When dealing with microfounded
models, the loss function can represent an approximation of the representative
households welfare and parameters of the loss function then depend on the deep
parameters of the model itself. In addition, for each of the hybrid models we
work with, the correspondent functional form of the loss function itself changes.
In order to address this concern, we incorporate both standard ad hoc and model
consistent loss in our analysis.
We restrict our attention to three diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation inertia. An
economy is assumed to exhibit low inertia if either γ = 0.2 in the IPI model or
(1−λ) = 0.2 in the ROT model. While a value of γ = 0.5 or (1−λ) = 0.5 implies
medium inﬂation inertia, high inﬂation inertia is characterized by γ = 0.8 and
(1 − λ) = 0.8.
5.1 Robustness of Optimized Interest Rate Rule
We use an instrument rule of the type described in Section 3.3. For diﬀerent
degrees of inﬂation inertia, we obtain the optimized interest rate rule that min-
imizes the model consistent loss function obtained using one model of inﬂation
inertia. Then we evaluate the performance of this rule when the inﬂation inertia
is described by the competing model. We then repeat this analysis using the
standard ad hoc loss function for both the models.
14Table 4: Robustness of Optimized Policy Rules
Inertia Persistence Comm. Loss Indexation to Past Inﬂation Rule of Thumb
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)














Low 0.20 0.20 387 840 467 20.86 626 61.98 938 11.67 1336 59.02
Medium 0.50 0.50 387 1323 457 18.12 1736 348.95 1338 0.78 4737 258.06
High 0.80 0.20 387 828 420 8.59 6127 1484.95 828 0.01 17437 2006.23
Standard ad hoc Loss
Low 0.20 0.20 608 1154 651 7.07 654 7.59 1273 10.33 1276 10.57
Medium 0.50 0.50 996 4735 1113 11.73 1497 50.34 5704 20.47 6952 46.83
High 0.80 0.20 2192 14411 2662 21.45 3953 80.34 14845 3.01 62442 333.29
In the IPI model, the model consistent loss under optimum commitment rule
is constant across diﬀerent degrees of indexation while the ROT model yields
a non monotonic loss as we increase the degree of inﬂation inertia.12 Table 4
reports the losses and the relative losses
Looking at Table 4, we ﬁnd that the optimized rule performs nearly as well
as the optimal commitment rule. Looking at columns (6) and (10) we ﬁnd
that both across diﬀerent levels of inertia as well as diﬀerent loss functions the
relative loss is less than 25 percent when we use an optimized rule instead of
the optimal rule.
The top panel shows that when the policymaker knows that the economy
is characterized by low inﬂation inertia then it is quite easy to obtain a robust
policy rule. Column (7) shows that a rule optimized for the ROT model yields
a relative loss of slightly more than 60 percent in the competing model where
as column (9) shows that a rule that was optimized for the IPI model yields a
relative loss of less than 60 percent. The reason for this robustness is very easy
to see. In the case where inﬂation inertia is low, the Phillips curves in both
the models are similar to baseline forward looking Phillips curve. Moreover, in
the case of low inﬂation inertia, the model consistent loss functions given by
equations (21) and (22) also become similar. In the extreme case when γ = 0
and (1 − λ) = 0 equations (10) and (14) collapses to (3) and the loss functions
given by (21) and (22) collapse to the standard loss function (18).
However, if the economy is characterized by medium or high inertia then it
becomes very diﬃcult to obtain a robust rule. In both cases when an optimized
rule is simulated in the competing model, the relative loss turns out to be
very high. As inﬂation becomes more and more persistent, the way inﬂation
inertia is modeled becomes important. Moreover, the loss function also becomes
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. While the structural loss function from the ROT behavior
12Walsh (2005) using targeting rules obtains a constant loss across diﬀerent degrees of inertia
for the IPI model with a distorted steady state.
15model comprise of inﬂation, output gap and inﬂation gap stabilization, the
loss from the IPI model seeks to stabilize output gap and a quasi diﬀerence of
inﬂation.
To look into this issue in more detail, we decompose the loss into the variance
of the target variables. Table 5 explains the reason for the diﬀerent values
of the loss functions. Columns (1) and (2) display the variance of the quasi
diﬀerence of inﬂation and output gap when the policymaker uses the optimized
rule for the IPI model and the economy is characterized by the IPI model. In
contrast, columns (3) and (4) exhibits the variances when the policymaker uses
a competing rule optimized for the ROT model. Similarly, columns (5), (6) and
(7) show the variance of inﬂation, the output gap and the inﬂation gap when
the policymaker implements the rule from the ROT model and the economy
is described by the ROT model while columns (8), (9) and (10) display the
variance when a competing rule from the IPI model is used.
Table 5: Decomposition of the Model Consistent Loss
Inertia Indexation to Past Inﬂation Rule of Thumb
Opt Rule Comp Rule Opt Rule Comp Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
V arz V arx V arz V arx V arπ V arx V ar∆π V arπ V arx V ar∆π
Low 4.60 5.72 2.27 85.79 4.01 135.69 4.10 10.54 12.26 7.05
Medium 4.12 10.67 0.95 346.59 2.38 588.03 2.07 33.96 37.19 9.27
High 3.65 12.71 0.12 1280.22 0.23 1609.84 0.18 126.94 47.62 9.26
Comparing column (1) and (2) with (3) and (4) we ﬁnd that when the
economy is actually described by the IPI model, the competing rule stabilizes
the quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation much more than the optimizing rule. While
both under the optimized and the competing rule, the variance of the quasi
diﬀerence of the inﬂation decreases as inﬂation inertia increases, the decreases
is more dramatic under the competing rule. One reason why the competing rule
stabilizes quasi diﬀerence more is to do with the diﬀerent functional form of the
loss functions. The competing rule is obtained from the ROT model and aims
to minimize variation of the inﬂation, output gap and inﬂation gap. In the the
ROT model as degree of inﬂation inertia increases, the policymaker becomes
more concerned about smoothing inﬂation than stabilizing inﬂation since the
weight on πt −πt−1 increases with inﬂation inertia. Thus the optimized rule for
the ROT model smooths inﬂation more than stabilizing it. When this rule is
implemented in the IPI model and the loss function is given by equation (22) it
stabilizes the quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation which is a deviant of the inﬂation gap.
However, under the competing rule, the variance of output gap is signiﬁ-
cantly higher compared to the optimized rule. We ﬁnd that the variance of
output gap increases both under the optimized and the competing rule as the
economy becomes more indexed, and the increase under the competing rule is
more dramatic. Again this divergence is due to the diﬀerent functional form of
16the loss function. In the ROT model the policymaker is less and less concerned
about output gap stabilization as the degree of inﬂation inertia increases. Thus
the optimized rule for the ROT model does not attempt to stabilize output gap
much. As a result when this rule is implemented in the IPI model we have
a higher variance of the output gap. From Table 2 and Table 3 we can see
that for any level of inﬂation inertia the policymaker following the IPI model
is always more concerned about output stabilization than when he follows the
ROT model. The higher variance of output gap when the competing rule is
implemented combined with higher weight on output gap variation in the IPI
model results in the higher loss.
The lower variance of the quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation under the competing
rule is more than oﬀset by the higher variance of the output gap thereby resulting
in a higher loss. The higher variance of the output gap under the competing
rule means that the performance of the competing rule deteriorates signiﬁcantly
as the economy becomes more indexed.
Columns (5) to (7) display the variance of the target variables when the
policymaker implements an optimized rule from the ROT model and the ﬁrms
set their prices according to the rule of thumb. We ﬁnd that as the degree of in-
ﬂation inertia increases, variability in both inﬂation and inﬂation gap decreases
whereas the variance of output gap increases. However, when a competing rule,
which is optimized for the IPI model, is simulated in the ROT model, variance
of all the three target variables increase with the degree of inﬂation inertia. The
increase in variance is maximum in the case of inﬂation as the rule from IPI
model does not seek to stabilize inﬂation explicitly. The competing rule is aimed
at stabilizing the output gap and quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation and therefore when
this rule is implemented in the ROT model it is able to stabilize the output gap
and inﬂation gap, which is a deviant of the quasi diﬀerence of inﬂation. The
higher variance of inﬂation when the competing rule is implemented in the ROT
model results in the higher loss. Thus we ﬁnd that when the policymaker at-
tempts to maximize the welfare of the representative individual and there is
uncertainty about how ﬁrms update their prices one can obtain a robust rule
only in the case where the economy is characterized by low inﬂation inertia.
Next, we focus on the case where the policymaker’s objectives are charac-
terized by equation (18). We follow the literature like Walsh (2005) and Levin
and Williams (2003) in assuming that this loss function is ﬁxed as we vary the
pricing behavior. The results from using this loss function is displayed in the
lower panel of Table 4 and Table 6. Looking at Table 4 we ﬁnd that even when
the policymaker evaluates the loss using a standard ad hoc loss function, the
optimized interest rate rules perform well relative to the optimal commitment
rule across the diﬀerent models and diﬀerent degrees of inertia.
Column (8) and (12) in Table 4 show that optimized rules from either model
will work well in the other model if the economy is characterized by low or
17medium inertia. The relative loss is less than 10 percent when the economy
is characterized by low inertia and around 50 percent when the economy is
characterized by medium inertia. However, when the economy is characterized
by high inﬂation inertia then a rule from the ROT model performs reasonably
well in the IPI model but not the other way around. The reason for this can
be found in Table 6. We ﬁnd that when the true economy is given by the IPI
model then both the components of the loss, variance of inﬂation and variance
of output gap, are of similar magnitudes across diﬀerent degrees of inﬂation
inertia. While the optimized rule stabilizes output gap more, the competing
rule does a better job of stabilizing inﬂation.
Table 6: Decomposition of the Standard ad hoc Loss
Inertia Indexation to Past Inﬂation Rule of Thumb
Opt Rule Comp Rule Opt Rule Comp Rule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
V arπ V arx V arπ V arx V arπ V arx V arπ V arx
Low 6.58 0.04 6.52 0.13 12.77 0.18 12.90 0.08
Medium 11.14 0.23 9.63 5.68 48.48 10.42 71.20 0.59
High 23.79 3.84 15.25 25.65 80.84 76.10 751.16 9.22
When the true economy is characterized by the ROT model and it is charac-
terized by low inﬂation inertia then both the optimized and the competing rule
yield similar variance of output gap and inﬂation. However, if the economy is
characterized by medium inﬂation inertia then even though the resulting loss is
similar the components of the loss are dissimilar. The optimizing rule stabilizes
inﬂation more while the competing rule stabilizes output gap more. Finally, if
the economy is characterized by high inertia then the competing rule performs
disastrously. Even though under the competing rule output gap is stabilized,
inﬂation becomes extremely volatile and this results in a very high loss.
Thus we conclude that in the case of model uncertainty if the policymaker
aims to minimize the welfare theoretic loss then a robust policy rule is obtained
only when the economy is characterized by low inertia. It is not easy to obtain a
robust rule if the economy is characterized by medium or high inﬂation inertia.
On the other hand if the policymaker aims to minimize the standard ad hoc
loss function then optimized policy rules from the ROT model perform very all
in both the models i.e. these rules are robust to model uncertainty. Thus if
the policymaker is uncertain about the price setting behavior of the ﬁrms then
it would be safe for the policymaker to use an optimized rule from the ROT
model.
5.2 Fault Tolerance
The results from the previous section show that it is not possible to obtain
robust optimized simple interest rate rules when the economy is characterized
by moderate and high inﬂation inertia, and the policy performance is evaluated
18using the model consistent loss function. In order to investigate further the
presence of robustness, in this section we use an alternative method, following
Levin and Williams (2003). This method, known as ‘Fault Tolerance’, consid-
ers deviations of a given parameter of the rule from its optimized value, and
computes the change in relative loss. A model exhibits high tolerance if large
deviations of the parameters from their optimized values imply a small change
(below 100 percent) in relative loss. Robustness is obtained when a range of
parameters values for the three coeﬃcients of the rule, corresponds to relative
loss below 100 percent in both models. In other words, one should look for
common areas of high tolerance across the two models.
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Figure 1: Fault Tolerance of both Models under Moderate Inﬂation Inertia
Figure 1 shows the fault tolerance of the two models under moderate inﬂation
inertia. The two models display high fault tolerance to the coeﬃcients on lagged
interest rate and inﬂation. The ROT model is quite intolerant with respect to
the deviations of the coeﬃcient on the output gap. On the other hand, the
IPI model shows high fault tolerance to the same coeﬃcient. Therefore, it is
possible to ﬁnd a small common range of the coeﬃcient on the output gap that
corresponds to low relative loss. Robust policy rules can be found provided
that the coeﬃcients on lagged interest rate and inﬂation is not below 0.5 and
0.6 respectively. The coeﬃcient on output gap should be restricted between 0.1
and 0.2.
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Figure 2: Fault Tolerance of both Models under High Inﬂation Inertia
Economies described by high inﬂation inertia are relatively less fault tolerant
to the coeﬃcients on lagged interest rate and inﬂation. In this case, robustness
requires ˜ ρ to be less than 1.3 and ˜ α to be limited between 1.2 and 2.2. Again,
the overlapping region of low relative loss for the coeﬃcient on the output gap
is restricted between 0.1 and 0.2.
Beginning with the change in the coeﬃcient on lagged interest rate, we ﬁnd
that optimal degree of interest rate smoothing is modest in case of moderate
inﬂation inertia and extremely small for high inﬂation inertia. This result is
coherent with the fact that interest rate smoothing does not play an important
role in backward looking models. In these economies, monetary policy perfor-
mance does not improve with inertial adjustment of the policy instrument due
to the absence of the expectation channel. As we deviate the coeﬃcient from
the optimized value, there is a deterioration of the relative loss across both
models, especially for high degree of inﬂation inertia. Typically, backward look-
ing models require a more forceful reaction to shocks in inﬂation and output
gap. Therefore, a higher concern for smoothing the interest rate prevents the
policymaker to be as forceful resulting in a higher relative loss.
According to Figure 1 and 2 the more backward looking versions of the
models require a stronger reaction to inﬂation. As noted above, the weak ex-
pectation channel in these models forces the policymaker needs to be more
20aggressive. This explains why under higher inﬂation inertia, the stability range
shifts to the right. In addition, one can notice that the relative loss increases
less rapidly with the coeﬃcient on inﬂation in the ROT model. This may be
due to the higher concern of the policymaker on inﬂation stabilization relative
to output gap stabilization in the ROT model.
The overall fault tolerance analysis indicates that if the policymaker responds
more aggressively to the output gap, there is an increase in the relative loss.
In the ROT model, the weight on the inﬂation gap is much higher than on
the output gap. Therefore, a higher volatility in inﬂation caused by a stronger
reaction to output gap explains the rise in the relative loss. However, comparing
Figure 1 and 2 we see that for moderate inﬂation inertia, the ROT model shows
marginally higher fault tolerance. This can be explained by the diﬀerence in
weights placed on inﬂation gap and output gap stabilization across the two
diﬀerent levels of inertia. In the case of high inﬂation inertia, the weight on
inﬂation gap (6.06) is signiﬁcantly higher than the weight on the output gap
(0.0044), i.e. the policymaker shows approximately 1400 times more concern
with inﬂation gap stabilization. On the other hand, under moderate inﬂation
inertia, this diﬀerence is relatively smaller implying that the weight on inﬂation
is about 110 times higher than the weight on output gap stabilization. Therefore,
relative loss under moderate inﬂation inertia increases at a lower rate.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we look at the two diﬀerent ways inﬂation inertia has been modeled
in the literature. We also look into the use of both a standard ad hoc loss
function and a welfare theoretic model consistent loss function to evaluate policy
outcomes. Using the standard ad hoc loss function we obtain the standard result
that policy performance deteriorates as the structural inﬂation process becomes
more inertial in both the ROT and IPI model. However, this results breaks
down when we use a model consistent loss function. In the IPI model the policy
performance improves as the degree of indexation increases. On the other hand
in the ROT model we get a non monotonic result with the loss being highest in
the case of medium inertia.
Next we focus on the case where the policymaker is uncertain about the price
setting behavior of the ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that if the policymaker is evaluating
outcomes using a welfare theoretic loss function then only in the case of low
inﬂation inertia, the policymaker is able to obtain a robust rule. However, if he
uses a standard ad hoc loss function with equal weight on inﬂation and output
gap stabilization then an optimized rule from ROT model proves to be robust
to model uncertainty.
Investigating further, the fault tolerance analysis of the two models under
model consistent loss indicates that it is possible to ﬁnd a range of parameter
21values for each coeﬃcient of the instrument rule over which both models perform
reasonably well. These ranges are fairly broad for the coeﬃcients on lagged
interest rate and inﬂation. However, the two models exhibit low relative loss
over an extremely narrow interval for the coeﬃcient on output gap.References
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A Setup of the Two Hybrid Models
The two models outlined in the paper have been solved following the method

















where x1t is the set of predetermined or backward looking variables and x2t
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where xt = [x1t,x2t]0 and ut is the instrument used by the policymaker.
A.1 Model Consistent Loss
A.1.1 Rule of Thumb Price Setters Model
The ROT Price Setters model is made up of n1 = 4 predetermined variables
[επt,εxt,πt−1,it−1] and n2 = 2 forward looking variables [πt,xt]. Equations
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where A = A
−1
0 A1 and B = A
−1
0 B0.
The model consistent loss in this model is given by equation (21). This loss
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where the F matrix is given as [0,0,0, ˜ ρ, ˜ α, ˜ β]
A.1.2 Indexation to Past Inﬂation
The IPI model also has n1 = 4 predetermined variables [επt,εxt,πt−1,it−1] and
n2 = 2 forward looking variables [πt,xt]. Again, equations (15), (16), (17) and
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where A = A
−1
0 A1 and B = A
−1
0 B0. The model consistent loss function of
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The instrument rule is given by the equation (A.3) where the F matrix is
given as [0,0,0, ˜ ρ, ˜ α, ˜ β].
A.2 Standard ad hoc Loss
A.2.1 Rule of Thumb Price Setters Model
The standard ad hoc loss function is given by equation 18. Since there is no
change in the structural equations of the model the A and B matrices are same
as in Section A.1.1. In the Q matrix we impose the condition λx = 1 and that
λ∆π = 0 so that equation (A.2) corresponds to equation 18. The R and U
matrices continue to be same as above
27A.2.2 Indexation to Past Inﬂation
The A and B matrices continue to be same as in section A.1.2. However, since









0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0








while the U and R matrices are same as above.
B Solving the Models
Given, the structural matrices A and B and the instrument rule matrix F the
dynamics of each of the model can be written as
x1t+1 = Mx1t+1 + εt+1 (A.4)
x2t = Cx1t (A.5)






where x10 is the value of the predetermined variables at time t = 0, Σ is the























C Calculating the Loss under Commitment
This subsection describes the procedure used to calculate the loss under the
commitment. The models need to be set up in the form shown in equation
(A.1. Deﬁne n1 as the dimension of x1t, n2 as the dimension of x2t and ﬁnally n
= n1 + n2. Let ρ1t be an n1×1 vector of Lagrangian multipliers associated with
the predetermined variables and ρ2t be an n2 × 1 vector of Lagrangian multi-
pliers associated with the forward looking variables. The rational expectations













































where ¯ C is of the dimension (n2 + 1 + n1) × (n1 + n2)
Let the loss function be given by
Lt = Z0






































































where S = [In2+1 0n2+1×n1]
Next we add the following equation to the system given by A.8
x1t+1 = M11x1t + M12ρ2t + εt+1 (A.13)





























29Given the linear quadratic structure the loss function L can be expressed as
X0
tV Xt + d where
X0




t+1V Xt+1 + d

X0
tV Xt = X0
tΓ0WΓXt + β[X0
tΩ0V ΩXt] + βtrace(V Σφ) (A.15)
or V satisﬁes
V = Γ0WΓ + βΩ0V Ω (A.16)
and d satisﬁes




where Σφ is the variance covariance matrix with the variance of [x1t,x1t,x2t]
on the diagonal. Equation (A.16) can be solved for the value of V and then
equation (A.17) can be used to obtain d.
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